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CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).evaluated by reviewing empirical evidence thatmental imagery
has a powerful impact on negative as well as positive emotions
at neurophysiological and subjective levels. Third, we review
contemporary cognitive and behavioral therapeutic practices
that use mental imagery, and consider points of extension and
departure fromLang’s original investigation ofmental imagery
in fear-extinction behavior change. Fourth, Lang’s experimen-
tal work on emotional imagery is revisited in light of
contemporary research on emotional psychopathology-linked
individual differences in mental imagery. Finally, key insights
from Lang’s experiments on training emotional response
during imagery are discussed in relation to how specific
techniques may be harnessed to enhance adaptive emotional
mental imagery training in future research.
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SCIENTIFIC INTEREST IN MENTAL IMAGERY dates back to
the 19th century (Galton, 1880), making imagery one
of the most enduring topics in psychological science.
Despite such extended interest in the phenomenon
of imagery, Peter Lang was one of the first scientists
to formulate a testable theory of emotion-inducing
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(1977, 1979) of emotional imagery was originally
developed to explain the role of mental imagery in
facilitating behavioral fear extinction in imaginal
exposure therapy. Lang’s (1977, 1979) theory opened
an experimental window onto “the mind’s emotional
eye,” and has spurred research and influenced clinical
practice in the ensuing decades. In reviewing theoret-
ical, empirical, and clinical developments related to
emotional mental imagery, we aim to highlight the
contemporary relevance of Lang’s theory, while
drawing attention to key insights that we believe are
capable of exerting a beneficial impact on future
research and clinical practice in years to come.
lang’s bio-informational theory of
emotional imageryMental imagery refers to perceptual experience in
the absence of sensory input, commonly described
as seeing with the “mind’s eye,” hearing with the
“mind’s ear,” and so on (Kosslyn, Ganis, &
Thompson, 2001). In this paper we consider mental
imagery both as an emotion-evoking stimulus
that can be manipulated (e.g., during therapeu-
tic techniques such as imaginal exposure; Foa,
Hembree, & Rothbaum, 2007), and as a symptom
of psychopathology (e.g., distressing intrusive mem-
ories/flashbacks in posttraumatic stress disorder; cf.
Holmes & Mathews, 2010).
In his bio-informational theory of emotional
imagery, Lang (1977, 1979) postulated that amental
imagery representation of an emotionally charged
stimulus (e.g., a spider) activates an associative
network of stored information that overlaps with
that activated during actual experience of the
stimulus in reality (e.g., encountering a live spider).
This associative network of information is said to
consist of perceptual information about the stimu-
lus (color, shape, size, texture of spider), semantic
information about what it means (insect, danger,
bite), somatovisceral response information about
what it feels like to encounter the stimulus (fear,
racing heart), and preparatory motor responses
evoked by the encounter (e.g., muscles tensing to flee
from the spider). According to this theory, mental
imagery differs from verbal thought in that only
mental imagery has the capacity to activate physio-
logical and behavioral response systems (Lang,
1987). Research pertaining to this assertion will be
discussed in Section III.
Lang's (1977, 1979) associative-network infor-
mation processing definition of mental imagery
was influenced by Pylyshyn's (1973) propositional
theory of mental imagery, which construed mental
imagery as conceptual representations describing
reality, rather than as pictorial representations depict-ing reality. Historically, the debate concerning
whether mental imagery involves conceptual repre-
sentations (Pylyshyn, 1973) or pictorial representa-
tions (Kosslyn, 1981) has been the subject of heated
debate. Neuroimaging and psychophysics evidence
gathered in the past 50 years has largely resolved the
debate in favor of the latter view (see Pearson,
Naselaris, Holmes, & Kosslyn, 2015, for a review).
Although this appears to refute the grounds of Lang’s
bio-informational theory, closer inspection reveals
that the validity of this theory stands irrespective of
whether mental imagery is conceptual or pictorial in
nature.
As Lang (1987) explicated, the bio-informational
theory was developed not as a theory on the nature of
mental imagery, but as a functional theory concerning
the impact of mental imagery on emotional process-
ing. Due to the overlap in perceptual information
between imagined and real stimuli, Lang (1977, 1979)
proposed that imagined interaction with a stimulus
can evoke corresponding emotional responses associ-
ated with real interaction with that stimulus. As such,
imagined interaction with stimuli can function as an
“as-if real” template for rehearsing and modifying
emotional and behavioral responses to the same
stimuli in real life. Lang (1977, 1979) proposed that
this function of mental imagery could be harnessed in
clinical treatment to facilitate fear-extinction learning
and habituation via the rehearsal and learning of new
adaptive responses during imaginal exposure therapy.
Indeed, numerous studies using a range of asso-
ciative learning paradigms have shown that mental
imagery can produce conditioned responses in the
same way as real stimuli (cf. Dadds, Bovbjerg, Redd,
& Cutmore, 1997; Lewis, O'Reilly, Khuu, &
Pearson, 2013). Crucially, Lang proposed that the
elicitation of a fear emotional response duringmental
imagery of the feared stimuli (simulation of both
perceptual representations and autonomic and be-
havioral responses) is required for learning to occur,
and is therefore necessary in order for imaginal
exposure to be effective (Lang, 1977; Wolpe, 1958).
Interestingly, Lang’s conception of mental imagery
as an “as-if real” template parallels contemporary
functional perspectives on mental imagery. These
contemporary accounts view mental imagery as a
core component of the "prospective brain," which
enables the simulation of hypothetical future events
based on prior knowledge and memories of past
experience for the purposes of prediction and
planning (Moulton & Kosslyn, 2009; Schacter,
Addis, & Buckner, 2008; Suddendorf & Corballis,
2007).
Of particular relevance to Lang’s (1977, 1979)
functional theory is Moulton and Kosslyn's (2009)
theory of mental imagery as emulation. Emulation
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ical scenario that simulates not only perceptual
information about an event, but also rich semantic
and affective information about plausible causes and
consequences of the imagined scenarios (Moulton &
Kosslyn, 2009). As such, bothLang (1977, 1979) and
Moulton and Kosslyn (2009) postulate that mental
imagery has the capacity to evoke cognitive and
emotional responses, enabling the individual to not
only “try out” one or more versions of what might
happen (Schacter et al., 2008, p. 40), but to also “try
out” the emotional consequences of alternative
courses of action (Lang, 1987, p. 412; Moulton &
Kosslyn, 2009, p. 1278).
By providing a pivotal testable framework linking
mental imagery to emotion, Lang’s (1977, 1979)
bio-informational theory paved the way for much
subsequent research concerning the functions of
mental imagery. While Lang focused on the role of
imagery in fear extinction learning, contemporary
theorists point to the wider role of mental imagery
in planning, problem solving, and self-regulation
(Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis,
2007; Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998).
The first half of this review will evaluate evidence
pertaining to Lang’s key proposal, that mental
imagery has the capacity to evoke emotional
responses, and explore how this capacity has been
exploited therapeutically in clinical treatment. The
second half of the review will consider how
subsequent research has built on Lang’s initial
work concerning individual differences to illumi-
nate how variability in imagery may relate to
emotional dysfunction, and highlight neglected in-
sights from Lang’s research on emotional imagery
training that could potentially contribute to future
treatment innovation.
Section I: Mental Imagery-Evoked
Emotional Response
Developments in clinical psychology over the past 50
years have shown that unwanted and distressing
mental imagery is a symptom present in a wide range
of anxiety andmooddisorders (Holmes&Mathews,
2010). In anxiety disorders, mental imagery phe-
nomena include the intrusive flashbacks that define
posttraumatic stress disorder (Brewin & Holmes,
2003; Ehlers et al., 2002), and imagery of feared
stimuli or distorted images of one’s own physical
appearance in the case of phobias or social phobia,
respectively (Hirsch & Holmes, 2007). Depression
and bipolar disorder symptomology also feature
mental imagery of past failures and trauma (Kuyken
& Brewin, 1994), as well as possible future events,
such as suicidal acts (Holmes, Crane, Fennell, &
Williams, 2007).While clinical presentation suggests that negative
mental imagery symptomology can have emotionally
distressing consequences for patients, researchers have
noted a relative paucity of studies designed to directly
evaluate this assumption (Holmes&Mathews, 2010;
Watts, 1997). Lang (1977, 1979) was one of the first
investigators to empirically examine the capacity for
mental imagery to evoke emotional response. Much
of Lang’s experimental work on mental imagery was
devoted to assessing psychophysiological reactiv-
ity to mental imagery cued by verbal scripts depicting
emotional scenarios and bodily responses (e.g., “your
face is flushed as your muscles strain to continue the
pace”). In this section, we review evidence resulting
from the work of Lang, and others, that mental
imagery does indeed have an impact on emotion, as
indexed by physiological, neurological, and subjec-
tive measures. Furthermore, response information
measured at these levels has also revealed biases in
emotional processing in individuals suffering from
emotional psychopathology, such as mood and
anxiety disorders.
the impact of emotional mental imagery on
physiological activity
It is widely accepted that emotional experience
involves activation of the central and peripheral
nervous systems (Gross & Barrett, 2011). Thus, if
mental imagery representations of emotional scenar-
ios are capable of eliciting emotional responses in an
“as-if real” manner (Kosslyn et al., 2001; Kreiman,
Koch, & Fried, 2000; Lang, 1979), this may be
observable at a physiological level.
Using verbal scripts depicting emotionally nega-
tive or neutral information, Lang’s (1977, 1979)
experimental work measured peripheral nervous
system responses while participants imagined the
content of the scripts. The central hypothesis was
that physiological effects would arise during emo-
tional imagery as a result of activation of perceptual
memories, triggering somatovisceral responses asso-
ciated with experience of the stimuli in reality.
In terms of autonomic arousal, Lang and col-
leagues observed greater heart rate acceleration
during mental imagery of high versus low arousal
scenarios. In healthy participants, imagery of fear and
anger-related scenarios led to greater heart rate
acceleration than did imagery of neutral scenarios
(Cook, Hawk, Davis, & Stevenson, 1991; Vrana,
1995; Vrana, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1986; Witvliet &
Vrana, 1995). Similarly, skin conductance response
(SCR) levels also indicated elevated emotional
arousal during mental imagery of emotional scenar-
ios, such that scripts depicting highly arousing
pleasant and unpleasant experiences produced larger
increases in SCR relative to those depicting neutral
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Miller, & Kozak, 1983; Weerts & Lang, 1978).
Research has shown that respiratory responses
are also influenced by mental imagery in healthy
populations. Specifically, imagery evoked by scripts
depicting high arousal scenes (fear and action-
related) compared to low arousal scenes (relaxation
and depression-related) produced greater drops in
end-tidal fractional carbon dioxide concentration,
likely reflecting hyperventilation (Van Diest et al.,
2001). Importantly, this hyperventilation during
emotional imagery was more pronounced in
individuals with higher relative to lower imagery
generation ability, as assessed using the Question-
naire UponMental Imagery (QMI; Sheehan, 1967).
This individual differences dimension in imagery
has also been explored in Lang’s work, and will be
considered in more detail in Section III.
In addition to autonomic indices, mental imagery
has been shown to modulate other indices of
physiological arousal, such as the startle blink
reflex. Vrana and Lang (1990) required healthy
participants to first learn and then recall six pairs of
sentences depicting fear-related and neutral scenar-
ios. During recall, participants were instructed
either to relax and ignore the sentence (control
condition), to silently articulate the sentence (verbal
condition), or to imagine the sentence content as
a personal experience (imagery condition). As
expected, startle blink reflexes evoked by acoustic
probes were found to be greater during recall of fear
relative to neutral sentences. Importantly, this effect
was greater in the imagery condition than in either the
control condition or the verbal condition (Cuthbert
et al., 2003).
Finally, mental imagery of food stimuli has been
shown to modulate the gustatory salivary reflex.
Research in the field of brain computer interfaces
(BCI) has found increases and decreases in salivary
pH levels compared to baseline as a result of a
healthy participant imagining consuming a lemon
versus drinkingmilk, respectively (Vanhaudenhuyse,
Bruno, Bredart, Plenevaux, & Laureys, 2007). This
finding has also been harnessed to demonstrate
conscious awareness in clinical patients with com-
plete locked-in syndrome (LIS), individuals who
cannot otherwise indicate the presence of conscious
awareness (Wilhelm, Jordan, & Birbaumer, 2006).
In addition to appetitive salivary responses, repet-
itive mental imagery of food consumption (eating
M&Ms) has also been shown to lead to food
item-specific satiation effects (Morewedge, Huh, &
Vosgerau, 2010). Although no physiological mea-
sures were included in the study, consumption of that
food itemwas reduced in the high-repetition imagery
group (30 repetitions) relative to the low-repetitionimagery group (three repetitions), indicating satiation
effects (Morewedge et al., 2010).
Together, the above evidence provides support
for Lang’s (1977, 1979) contention that mental
imagery has the capacity to activate the peripheral
nervous system and evoke somatic responses, be it
in the form of “fight or flight” sympathetic system
response during fear- or anger-related imagery, or
“rest and digest” parasympathetic response during
gustatory imagery. However, one limitation associ-
ated with using physiological indicators of autonom-
ic nervous system (ANS) activation is that these can
be employed only to index high arousal emotions,
such as anger, fear, disgust, or elation. In contrast,
both high and lowarousal emotional responses canbe
assessed using neurological measures, such as those
provided by neuroimaging.
Furthermore, the studies reviewed in this section
have not explicitly contrasted mental imagery
representations of emotional stimuli to an alternative
mode of representation of the same information, and
therefore one cannot conclude based on the evidence
that the physiological effects observed reflect the
impact of mental imagery per se, rather than the
impact of emotional information processing in
general. Research addressing this limitation will be
discussed in Section III.
the impact of emotionalmental imagery on
neural measures of emotional response
According to Lang's (1979) bio-informational theo-
ry, emotional imagery is hypothesized to be able to
elicit similar physiological responses in both periph-
eral and central systems as would be evoked during
actual experience (Lang & McTeague, 2009). Since
the 1970s, developments in brain imaging technology
have enabled assessment of the impact of emotional
imagery on central nervous system (CNS) structures
involved in coordinating peripheral nervous system
(PNS) responses.
Neural indices of emotion processing during
emotional mental imagery can be evaluated in
comparison to activity observed during veridical
perception of emotional stimuli, or to emotionally
neutral mental imagery. Meta-analytic reviews of
neuroimaging studies on healthy participants show
that the brain regions most consistently associated
with emotional processing are the dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC), anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC) and amygdala (Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, &
Lawrence, 2003; Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon,
2002), and the insular cortex (Craig, 2009), all of
which are involved in the coordination of ANS
activity.Activation of these same emotion-processing
regions has been observed during emotional mental
imagery. Early hemodynamic neuroimaging studies
706 j i e t al .using positron emission tomography (PET) showed
that mental imagery of emotional relative to neutral
information elicited increased regional cerebral blood
flow (rCBF) to the mPFC, ACC and anterior insula
(Kosslyn et al., 1996; Partiot, Grafman, Sadato,
Wachs & Hallett, 1995; Schaefer et al., 2003). This
effect has been found in PET studies not only for
mental imagery evoked by scripts depicting negative
scenarios (aggression and guilt-related) (Shin et al.,
2000), but also for mental imagery evoked by scripts
depicting positive scenarios (success and affection-
related) (Schaefer et al., 2003).
More recent studies have used script-driven
emotional imagery to examine the specificity of
neural circuits for the processing of emotional
valence versus arousal. Costa, Lang, Sabatinelli,
Versace, and Bradley (2010) used functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine negative,
positive, and neutral script-driven imagery, and
found that activation of the amygdala was enhanced
during emotional relative to neutral imagery, irre-
spective of emotional valence. However, activation
of the nucleus accumbens (NAc) and mPFC were
selectively enhanced during positive relative to neutral
imagery, not negative relative to neutral imagery
(Costa et al., 2010). Results from this script-driven
imagery study are also consistent with a previous
fMRI study where participants viewed positive and
neutral pictures (Sabatinelli, Bradley, Lang, Costa, &
Versace, 2007).
Studies using fMRI have also compared neural
responses to real versus imagined emotional stimuli
in the same participants. Kim et al. (2007) found
comparablemagnitudes of left hemisphere amygdala
activity betweenwhen participants viewed faces with
negative and positive emotional expressions and
when they generated mental imagery of such faces.
In fMRI studies using real-time neural activation
feedback (“neurofeedback”), over successive trials
participants were able to use self-generated visuali-
zation of positive and negative scenarios to regulate
the activation of emotion processing regions such as
the insula (S. Lee et al., 2011). In addition to face
stimuli, mental imagery of positive and negative
events in the past and future has been shown to
activate the amygdala and ACC (Sharot, Riccardi,
Raio, & Phelps, 2007). In another study examining
negative and positive mental imagery in the same
participants, Damasio et al. (2000) found different
ACC subregionswere differentially activated by fear,
anger, happiness, and sadness imagery.
Finally, direct evidence that visual imagery and
visual perception share common neural systems
implicated in emotional response comes from a
single-cell recording study on human epileptic
patients. Kreiman et al. (2000) found that 75% ofthe 89 recorded cells in the amygdala selectively
altered their firing rates in comparable patterns
during both visual perception and visual imagery
recall of emotional faces, whereas 4% and 10%
responded selectively to imagery or veridical per-
ception, respectively (Kreiman et al., 2000).
As such, results from neuroimaging and single cell
recording studies provide converging evidence that
mental imagery has the capacity to evoke an
emotional response by activating neural networks
involved in emotional processing and response
coordination with the autonomic nervous system.
However, as with the physiology studies reviewed
earlier, the neuroimaging studies reviewed here have
not explicitly contrasted mental imagery representa-
tions of emotional stimuli to an alternative mode of
representation of the same information, and therefore
one cannot conclude based on the evidence that the
physiological effects observed reflect the impact of
mental imagery per se, rather than the impact of
emotional information processing in general.
disruption of emotional mental imagery
reduces emotional impact
If mental imagery-based representation of emo-
tional information serves to elicit emotional re-
sponses to this information, then it follows that
disruption of such imagery should reduce the
intensity of such emotional responding. This
hypothesis has been investigated using dual task
paradigms that reduce the availability of cognitive
resources required for mental imagery generation.
Typically, in such studies, participants attempt to
generate mental imagery while undertaking a con-
current task that consumes working memory re-
sources, such as sequenced finger tapping on a
number pad, or mental arithmetic.
Across several exper iments , Andrade,
Kavanagh, and Baddeley (1997) asked healthy
participants to generate visual imagery from
emotionally negative versus neutral cues (photo-
graphs and personal memories) while concurrently
tapping a spatial pattern with a finger, engaging in
lateral eye movements, or performing no concur-
rent task. Results showed lower vividness of mental
imagery in the concurrent spatial tapping and
lateral eye movement conditions, relative to the
no-concurrent task control condition. Critically,
this reduction in the imagery vividness was
accompanied by a corresponding decline in the
intensity of participants’ emotional responding to
the negative, compared to neutral, cues. This result
was replicated by Kavanagh, Freese, Andrade, and
May (2001) using awithin-subjects design inwhich
participants generated both positive and negative
autobiographical episodic memory imagery at
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imagery generation took place without a concur-
rent imagery interference task, whereas at the
second time point, imagery interference was
produced by concurrent performance of a lateral
eye-movement task and viewing of dynamic visual
noise, in counterbalanced order. Concurrent im-
agery interference was successful in reducing the
vividness ratings for negative (but not positive)
memories, as compared to the no-interference
condition. Again, the critically important finding
was that performance of the concurrent task also
served to dampen the emotional impact of these
memories.
Clinical researchers have also begun to harness the
potential for concurrent tasks to reduce the emotional
impact of processing affectively toned mental imag-
ery. The use of a concurrent mathematics task during
recall of real-life collective trauma has been shown to
reduce the emotional impact of recalling the trau-
matic event in the general population (Engelhard, van
den Hout, & Smeets, 2011). Likewise, it has been
shown that performance of a concurrent capacity-
consuming task reduces the emotional impact of
thinking about feared future events in healthy
participants (Engelhard, van den Hout, Janssen, &
van der Beek, 2010), in students who report
high frequency of intrusive future fear imagery
(Engelhard, van den Hout, Dek, et al., 2011), and
in clinical patients with PTSD (Lilley, Andrade,
Turpin, Sabin-Farrell, & Holmes, 2009). Lilley et al.
(2009) asked a group of patients with PTSD to
generate trauma-related mental imagery while en-
gaging in concurrent lateral eye movements, count-
ing out loud, or performing no concurrent task.
Participants in the eye-movement condition reported
the lowest levels of imagery vividness, followed by
those in the phonological counting condition, while
participants in the no-concurrent task control
condition reported the highest levels of imagery
vividness. The intensity of negative emotion experi-
enced by participants during this procedure followed
this exact same function, being lowest in the
participants who performed the concurrent eye
movement task, intermediate in those who per-
formed the concurrent phonological counting task,
and highest in those who performed no concurrent
task. Thus, manipulating the vividness of mental
imagery through the use of this concurrent task
approach served to influence the emotional impact of
processing trauma-relevant information.
In addition to voluntarily generated imagery,
researchers investigating intrusive flashbacks in
PTSD have also begun to evaluate the possibility
that capacity-consuming concurrent tasksmay also be
capable of reducing the frequency and emotionalimpact of involuntary mental imagery. There is
growing evidence that playing the visuospatial com-
puter game “Tetris” following exposure to analogue
trauma reduces the frequency of subsequent involun-
tary memory imagery. Holmes, James, Coode-Bate,
and Deeprose (2009) had healthy participants view
film clips depicting traumatic scenes, then either play
the visuospatial game Tetris after film viewing, or not.
Participants used a diary to report intrusive imagery
of the film clip content over the following week.
Participants who played Tetris after film viewing
reported experiencing fewer such imagery intrusions,
relative to those who had not. This effect appears to
be modality-specific, as playing a predominantly
verbal “pub quiz” game after film viewing did reduce
subsequent imagery intrusions to the same degree as
playing Tetris (Holmes, James, Kilford, & Deeprose,
2010). Subsequent studies have also found Tetris
game play to be effective in reducing intrusivememory
frequency when memories were reactivated 24 hours
after initial film viewing (James et al., 2015). Future
research could profitably investigate whether Tetris
alleviates imagery intrusions in PTSD symptoms
specifically because of visuospatial disruption (James
et al., 2015) or as a result of more general working
memory taxation (Van den Hout & Engelhard,
2012), as investigators remain divided in their views
concerning this issue.
Section II: Mental Imagery-Evoked Emotional
Response in Psychopathology
Mental imagery-evoked emotional responses have
been used to study emotional psychopathology,
primarily in anxiety research. Evidence has revealed
variations in neural and physiological responses
across anxiety disorder subtypes. For example, while
there is evidence that, overall, anxiety patients
exhibit greater amygdala and insula activity during
aversive imagery and picture viewing relative to
healthy controls, this hyperactivation ismore evident
in social anxiety disorder and specific phobias
compared to PTSD (cf. Etkin & Wager, 2007).
Similarly, during fear relative to neutral memory
imagery, specific and social phobics showed greater
increases in heart rate and startle reflex response
(but not skin conductance) compared to healthy
participants (Cuthbert et al., 2003). However, those
with panic disorder and PTSD showed hyporeac-
tivity relative to healthy controls, even when
baseline heart rate and startle potentiation were
taken into account (Cuthbert et al., 2003). Using
the same paradigm, McTeague et al. (2010) found
that while PTSD patients generally exhibited
greater increases in heart rate and startle reflex
response (but not in skin conductance) compared to
healthy controls, more severe multitrauma PTSD
708 j i e t al .patients showed blunted heart rate, skin conduc-
tance, and startle reflex responses compared to
single-trauma PTSD patients (McTeague et al.,
2010). Indeed, reduced neural fear responding has
been linked to the dissociative subtype of PTSD,
characterized by symptoms of depersonalization
and derealization, symptoms associated with higher
trauma severity and chronicity (Lanius, Brand,
Vermetten, Frewen, & Spiegel, 2012).
Blunted neurophysiological reactivity to aversive
imagery is hypothesized to be attributable to the
effects of chronic stress and depression comorbid-
ity, which appears to be more evident in individuals
with pervasive anxiety-based disorders rather than
focal fear-based phobias (for a review, see Lang &
McTeague, 2009).
concordance between subjective and
physiological response to emotional
mental imagery in psychopathology
Variations in the level of concordance between
subjective emotional distress and physiological arous-
al during aversive mental imagery have also been
investigated as an indicator of emotional psychopa-
thology. This section will review studies that have
assessed the level of concordance between self-report,
physiological and neural measures.
In healthy volunteers, there is evidence of concor-
dance between self-report and physiological indica-
tors of emotional responding. For example, in a study
with healthy volunteers reporting high fear of snakes
or public speaking, Lang et al. (1983, Experiment 2)
found concordance between self-report and physio-
logical indicators of arousal during fear-imagery,
though only when participants had been trained
beforehand to focus on their own somatic responses
during imagery, and not when participants instead
had been trained to focus on visual perceptual
information about the stimuli. Similarly, Dalgleish
et al. (2013) found concordant variation in subjective
reports and physiological indicators (skin conduc-
tance and heart rate) of emotional responses during
imagery of personal memory imagery of fear, anger,
happiness and sadness, in 41 out of 53 participants.
In anxiety disorders, Lang and colleagues found
enhanced self-reported distress and heart rate and
skin conductance reactivity during imagery of
personal phobic stimuli relative to personal non-
phobia-related stimuli and standardized stimuli
(Cook, Melamed, Cuthbert, McNeil, & Lang,
1988). Interestingly, the congruence between levels
of subjective distress and physiological fear response
was greatest in participants with simple phobias,
followed by those with social phobia, with the least
congruence found in those with agoraphobia (Cook
et al., 1988). Similarly, McNeil, Vrana, Melamed,Cuthbert, and Lang (1993) assessed aversive imagery
in volunteers and clinically anxious patients with
simple and social phobias, and found that subjective
reports of imagery vividness and emotional distress
were positively related to heart rate reactivity in those
with simple phobias (e.g., dental surgery) but not in
those with social (speech) phobia.
As reviewed in Lang and McTeague (2009),
subjective reports of emotional distress in anxiety
disorders are not always accompanied by concordant
levels of physiological fear response, at least for startle
potentiated reflex responses. Whereas exaggerated
startle reflex response is found in patients with
specific and social phobia during phobic imagery
and picture-viewing, blunted startle response is found
in patients with more severe anxiety profiles, such as
those with agoraphobia, panic disorder, generalized
anxiety disorder (GAD), and comorbid depression
(Lang & McTeague, 2009). Indeed, physiological
response to aversive mental imagery appears to
be negatively related to disorder chronicity, severity,
and depression-comorbidity, possibly reflecting sup-
pressed defensive reactivity due to long-term stress
(McTeague & Lang, 2012).
However, the view that chronic anxiety is
associated with negative emotional suppression is
inconsistent with the Contrast Avoidance Model of
worry (Newman & Llera, 2011). This model
postulates that individuals with GAD defensively
recruit a perpetuated negative emotional state to
emotionally prepare for unexpected negative events.
Preliminary evidence in support of this model is
provided by the finding that worry-induction in
healthy volunteers and GAD patients increases
negative emotional states at both subjective and
physiological (skin conductance) levels, preventing
further increases during exposure to negative imag-
ery (Peasley-Miklus & Vrana, 2000) and film clips
(Llera & Newman, 2014). The presence of ceiling
effects in negative emotional reactivity to imaginal
and real aversive stimuli should be further investi-
gated in GAD and other anxiety-disorder subtypes.
Section III: The Impact of Mental Imagery on
Emotion—A Comparison With
Verbal Representation
Section I reviewed evidence that mental-imagery-
based representations of emotional information elicit
emotional responses at physiological, neurological,
and subjective levels. However, as noted earlier,
such studies did not contrast mental imagery to
an alternative mode of representation of the same
information, and therefore it is unknown whether the
effects observed during emotional imagery reflect an
impact of emotional informationprocessing in general
or mental imagery per se. This section reviews studies
709emot ional mental imagery as s imulat ion of real i tythat have attempted to answer this question by
contrasting mental imagery to verbal representations
of emotional information.
In several studies, Lang and colleagues compared
the impact of mental imagery versus verbal
information processing of fear-related and neutral
sentences (Cuthbert et al., 2003; Vrana et al.,
1986). Participants were instructed either to gener-
ate mental imagery based on previously memorized
fearful sentences, or to verbally repeat the sentences
in silence without generating accompanying mental
imagery. Results showed significant and sustained
heart rate acceleration relative to baseline during
mental imagery, but not during verbal repetition of
fearful scenarios (Cuthbert et al., 2003; Vrana et al.,
1986). This suggests that mental-imagery-based
processing of emotional information has a greater
impact on emotion than verbal processing.
However, several experimental design issues con-
strain the interpretation of these results. First, self-
reported emotional impactwas elicited only following
mental imagery of scenarios in Vrana et al. (1986),
but not following verbal repetition of scenarios. Thus,
it is unclear whether imagery-based processing led
to greater subjective emotional response compared
to verbal-based processing of the same information
(Holmes & Mathews, 2005). Second, due to prior
memorization of the cue sentences, participants
necessarily engaged in verbal processing of the
scenarios prior to completing both mental imagery
and verbal repetition conditions. Thus, it is difficult to
determine whether differences in emotional response
between the imagery and verbal processing conditions
simply reflect the recruitment of an additional
representational system in the imagery condition
(Holmes & Mathews, 2005). Finally, while partici-
pants in the imagery condition elaborated on sentence
content by simulating them as a personal experience,
those in the verbal condition simply repeated the
sentences. Thus, it is possible that differences in the
level of semantic elaboration between the conditions
contributed to differences in observed physiological
response.
Following Vrana et al. (1986), a series of studies
conducted more controlled comparisons of the
subjective emotional impact of mental imagery
versus verbal processing of emotionally negative
information. A commonly used experimental par-
adigm has involved exposing participants to
scenarios that, while initially ambiguous, ultimately
resolved in a manner that produces an emotionally
valenced representation of the described situation.
Experimenters have contrasted the emotional im-
pact of manipulating whether these representations
are imagery-based or verbal in nature. Thus, for
example, Holmes and Mathews (2005) instructedhealthy participants to either generate imagery or
focus on the semantic meaning of 100 such initially
ambiguous auditory scenarios that always resolved
negatively (“You are at work when you hear the fire
alarms go off. You run to the exit to discover that it
is . . . for real”). Holmes andMathews (2005) found
that participants in the imagery condition reported
greater increases in self-reported anxiety as mea-
sured using the Spielberger State Anxiety Inventory
(STAI-S; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, &
Jacobs, 1983) (Experiment 1: M = 7.3; Experiment
2: M = 5.67), relative to the verbal condition
(Experiment 1: M = 1.9; Experiment 2: M = 1.55).
Importantly, the enhanced emotional impact of
mental imagery relative to verbal processing is not
restricted to negative material. Using a similar
experimental approach, but employing initially
ambiguous auditory sentences that always resolved
positively, Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, and
Mackintosh (2006) found healthy participants in
the mental imagery generation condition reported
greater increases in positive affect (M = +7.15, SD =
10.30) than those in the verbal condition (M =
-6.08, SD = 9.63), as measured using the Positive
and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-X; Watson
& Clark, 1994). This effect of greater emotional
impact of imagery relative to verbal processing has
since been replicated in several studies (Holmes,
Coughtrey, & Connor, 2008; Holmes, Lang, &
Shah, 2009; Nelis, Vanbrabant, Holmes, & Raes,
2012; Pictet, Coughtrey, Mathews, & Holmes,
2011).
In addition to transient effects on positive emotion,
the impact of positive mental imagery has been
shown to persist in the short term. Holmes, Lang, &
Shah (2009) asked healthy participants to complete
the task described above, and subsequently exposed
these participants to a negative mood induction
procedure. Participants in the imagery condition
experienced a less severe decrement in positive mood
following the negative mood induction procedure
(PANASM = -4.90, SD = 6.88) than did those in the
verbal condition (PANAS M = -10.90, SD = 8.33).
Consistent with research on the buffering effects of
positive mood on negative mood (Fredrickson,
1998), Holmes, Lang, & Shah (2009) results suggest
that positive mental imagery may have a greater
potential to buffer the emotional impact of a negative
mood induction than does positive verbal thought.
The experimental approach adopted by Holmes
and colleagues differs from that employed by Vrana
et al. (1986) in two importantways. First, participants
in the verbal representation condition were instructed
to form meaningful representations of the auditory
scenario, requiring them to engage in semantic
processing rather than simply engage in verbal
710 j i e t al .repetition of the information, aswas the case inVrana
et al.’s approach. Second, subjective emotional
response to the information was compared when
this was represented in an imagery format and in a
verbal format. Thus, while Vrana et al. (1986) were
able only to conclude that imagery-based represen-
tations exert an impact on subjective emotional
experience, Holmes and colleagues have been able to
demonstrate that imagery-based representations
exert a greater impact on subjective emotional
experience than do verbal representations.
In the studies described above, the information
that participants were required to represent was
always presented in a verbal format. Thus, it could
be the case that the greater emotional impact of the
imagery condition reflects the fact that the infor-
mation is represented in twomodalities, both verbal
and imagery, while in the verbal condition the
information is represented in only a single modality
(Pictet & Holmes, 2013). To address this issue, an
alternative experimental paradigm, the Picture-
Word Task (PWT), was developed (Holmes,
Mathews, Mackintosh, & Dalgleish, 2008). In the
PWT, cue items consist of both a visual image and a
negative or benign word caption (e.g., a picture of a
person in a lake accompanied by the word sink or
swim). Participants are asked to combine the
picture and the word using either imagery (“form
a mental image that combines the next picture and
word”) or verbal statement (“form a sentence that
combines the next picture and the word”). Thus, in
this design, the stimulus materials are comprised of
image-based and verbal information. Results from
the PWT were consistent with the previous finding
that imagery-based representation evoked a stronger
impact on subjective emotional experience than
verbal representation of the same information.
Specifically, Holmes, Mathews, Mackintosh, &
Dalgleish, 2008 found that using mental imagery to
combine negative picture-word cues resulted in
greater increases in anxiety (M = +7.06, SD = 5.84)
than did the use of verbal processing to combine
these cues (M = +2.43, SD = 3.01); and using mental
imagery to combine benign picture-word cues
resulted in a greater reduction in anxiety (M =
-3.81, SD = 5.94) than did the use of verbal
processing to combine these cues (M = +1.0, SD =
2.22).
Therefore, on the basis of the reviewed evidence,
it is appropriate to conclude that imagery-based
processing of emotional information has a greater
impact on subjective emotional experience than
does verbal processing of the same information. In
relation to Lang’s original postulation that only
mental imagery has the capacity to activate physio-
logical and behavioral response systems, evidencefrom studies on anxiety suggests that more verbal
forms of thinking, such as worry, can also impact
cardiovascular (Brosschot, Pieper, & Thayer, 2005;
Llera & Newman, 2010) and neural activity
consistent with a negative emotional response
(Oathes et al., 2008). We also note here that worry
has been defined as “a chain of thoughts and images,
negatively affect-laden and relatively uncontrollable”
(Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983).
Section IV: Harnessing Mental Imagery’s
Powerful Emotional Impact in Clinical Practice
When Lang's (1979) bio-informational theory of
emotional imagery was developed, behaviorism was
the dominant approach within clinical psychology.
At this time, mental imagery was used to evoke
emotion during imaginal exposure treatment of
anxiety disorders to help clients learn new emotional
and behavioral responses and train self-control
(Goldfried, 1971) via graded imaginal desensitiza-
tion (Wolpe, 1958) or rapid flooding to feared
stimuli (Wolpe, 1973).
Developments in cognitive and social psychology
in subsequent decades has shown that an individual’s
thoughts can exert a strong influence on his/her
behavior and wellbeing. As a result, the content and
phenomenology of an individual’s mental
imagery-based thoughts have themselves become
the subject of analysis and modification (A. T. Beck,
1970; Lazarus, 1968). Building upon Judith Beck’s
cognitive therapy imagery formulations (J. S. Beck,
1995), new mental imagery techniques have been
brought into the clinic. The following section will
briefly review contemporary cognitive and behav-
ioral (CBT) therapeutic techniques that have built
upon the legacy of Lang’s early work, which include:
(a) imaginal exposure, (b) the direct modification of
the content of aversive imagery-based thoughts,
(c) the promotion of adaptive imagery, (d) metacog-
nitive reappraisal of imagery, and (e) imagery-based
cognitive modification of maladaptive thinking
habits.
Imaginal exposure (IE) treatments are still widely
used in contemporary clinical practice, with a strong
evidence base for treating anxiety disorders ranging
from specific phobias (Craske, Antony, & Barlow,
2006), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Abramowitz,
Franklin, & Foa, 2002), generalized anxiety disorder
(Zinbarg, Craske, & Barlow, 2006), to PTSD (Foa
et al., 2007). Seminal advances in mechanistic
understandings of fear extinction learning and
habituation have been informed by the legacy of
Lang’s bio-informational theory and experimental
work (e.g., Lang, Melamed, & Hart, 1970). Specif-
ically, it has been proposed that for extinction
learning and habituation to occur in imaginal
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must evoke fear processing structures in the brain,
including both stimulus and response networks (Foa
&Kozak, 1986). Evidence for this centralmechanism
of change comes from the numerous subsequent
studies showing that patients who exhibit initial
physiological fear responses and subsequent habitu-
ation of such responses benefit more from imaginal
exposure therapy than those who do not (Craske,
Sanderson,&Barlow, 1987; Jaycox, Foa,&Morral,
1998; Kozak, Foa, & Steketee, 1988; Mueser,
Yarnold, & Foy, 1991).
There is increasing evidence that the efficacy of IE,
at times combined with other behavioral or cognitive
treatments, is superior to psychopharmacology for
OCD (Foa et al., 2005) and PTSD (Van Etten &
Taylor, 1998). For GAD, IE-based CBT has been
found to be more effective than nondirective and
relaxation-based techniques (Borkovec & Costello,
1993). Interestingly, a growing body of research has
used virtual reality simulations during exposure
therapy to treat a range of anxiety disorders (for
reviews see Opriş et al., 2012; Morina, Ijntema,
Meyerbröker, & Emmelkamp, 2015). Preliminary
evidence suggests that exposure treatments using
mental imagery simulations (IE) versus virtual reality
simulations of feared stimuli have comparable
efficacy for fear of flying (Rus-Calafell,
Gutiérrez-Maldonado, Botella, & Baños, 2013) and
public speaking (Wallach, Safir,&Bar-Zvi, 2009). In
addition to anxiety disorders, researchers have also
successfully used IE to reduce intrusive mental
imagery in major depression, with promising results
in terms of therapeutic benefits (Kandris & Moulds,
2008).
Imagery rescripting techniques designed to directly
modify the content of emotion-inducing mental
imagery have been developed, helping clients trans-
form their unwanted distressing imagery into more
benign forms (Hackmann, Bennett-Levy,&Holmes,
2011). Such techniques have been combined with
exposure treatment for a range of disorders, from
PTSD and personality disorders (e.g., Arntz &
Weertman, 1999; Butler & Holmes, 2009; Long &
Quevillon, 2009; Smucker & Dancu, 1999/2005),
to snake and social phobia (Hunt & Fenton, 2007;
Wild, Hackmann, & Clark, 2007). For PTSD,
evidence suggests that imaginal exposure therapy
combined with imagery rescripting is more effective
than imaginal exposure therapy alone (Arntz,
Tiesema, & Kindt, 2007; Grunert, Weis, Smucker,
& Christianson, 2007). Imagery rescripting has also
been used to reduce intrusive mental images in
healthy populations (Rusch, Grunert, Mendelsohn,
& Smucker, 2000) and in people with depression
(Brewin et al., 2009). Rescripting of intrusive imageryassociated with negative memories has shown
initial promise as a stand-alone treatment for major
depression (Brewin et al., 2009). For a detailed review
of imagery rescripting treatments, see Arntz (2012)
and Holmes, Arntz, and Smucker (2007)).
In addition to the development of clinical tech-
niques intended to attenuate negative imagery,
clinical investigators have also sought to develop
methods of fostering the generation of positive
imagery, to help clients build more adaptive rela-
tionships between self, others, and the world
(Hackmann et al., 2011). Symbolic positive imagery
has been used to help clients access adaptive
emotional states, in interventions such as Compas-
sion Mind Training (CMT; P. Gilbert, 2009), which
was inspired by work on the perfect nurturer image
by D. A. Lee (2005). Other positive imagery
techniques include guiding clients to construct and
road test ideal ways of being in personality disorders
(Mooney & Padesky, 2000) or to form mental
images of positive scenarios to counter the types of
negative beliefs observed in personality disorders,
eating disorders, and obsessive-compulsive disorder
(Korrelboom, de Jong, Huijbrechts, & Daansen,
2009). Positive imagery can also be used to attenuate
or replace negative imagery in vivo. In social anxiety,
generating and holding in mind positive images of
one’s own appearance, to displace negative images of
oneself appearing red and sweaty, has been shown to
reduce anxiety and improve social performance
(Hirsch, Mathews, Clark, Williams, & Morrison,
2003). Positive imagery has also been shown to
function as an effective distractor for chronic pain
patients (Fors, Sexton, & Gotestam, 2002).
A third category of imagery-focused interven-
tions aims not to directly alter potentially distres-
sing negative mental imagery but rather to change
how the patient thinks about these images, in ways
that reduce their emotional impact. Metacognitive
strategies aim to down regulate the impact of
distressing mental imagery via reappraisal (Gross,
2002). Techniques include encouraging patients to
perceive mental images as subjective phenomena
(Wells, 2003) rather than meaningful premonitions
or signs that one’s mind is out of control (Starr &
Moulds, 2006; Williams&Moulds, 2007). Another
approach is mindfulness-based cognitive therapy,
in which clients are trained to regard their verbal
thoughts and mental images as mere passing mental
phenomena that do not require a response (Segal,
Teasdale, & Williams, 2002).
More recent developments in experimental clinical
research have begun to develop mental imagery-
focused cognitive training informed by cognitive
bias modification (CBM) paradigms. CBM aims to
reduce maladaptive imagery styles and boost
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(Blackwell et al., 2015; Williams et al., 2015). Such
mental imagery training approaches are informed by
research that has illuminated psychopathology-
linked individual differences in imagery, which will
be discussed in more detail with the next section of
this review.
Hence, clinical practice is increasingly harnessing
the power of mental imagery to facilitate adaptive
emotional functioning. The efficacy of such ap-
proaches may be further enhanced by future research
designed to illuminate the potentially critical role of
variability in the strength of the emotional response,
observed during imagery in the clinic, in determining
treatment outcomes. Given that the elicitation of
both subjective and physiological emotional re-
sponses during imaginal exposure is a central
mechanism of change in the successful treatment of
fear, the effectiveness of other treatments that use
mental imagery to optimize emotional functioning
may also depend on the client’s emotional response
during imagery. In our view, research investigating
differences between treatment responders compared
to nonresponders in the emotional impact of mental
imagery may prove fruitful in informing future
translational research in this field.
Section V: Individual Differences in Mental
Imagery and Emotional Psychopathology
So far, this review has discussed mental imagery in
terms of its capacity to evoke emotional responses,
the presence of disorder-linked variations in this
emotional response, and the ways that clinical
practice has harnessed mental imagery to facilitate
emotional processing. However, one relatively
neglected aspect of mental imagery that is of potential
clinical significance is differences across individuals
in the ability and tendency to experience emotional
imagery. Here, “ability” is simply defined as the
deliberate generation of imagery, and “tendency” as
the nondeliberate (i.e., spontaneous) generation of
imagery. This section will review research on
individual differences in emotional mental imagery
tendency and ability in both healthy and clinical
populations.
An interesting finding from Lang’s experimental
work on the emotional impact of mental imagery is
the observation that the level of emotional response
experienced during imagery is related to how vividly
an individual can generate mental imagery in general
(imagery generation ability). Lang and colleagues
found that, in healthy participants, heart rate
acceleration during fearful imagery was more
pronounced in individuals with high imagery ability,
relative to those with low imagery ability, as assessed
by a self-report questionnaire (Miller et al., 1987).However, such a relationship between self-reported
imagery ability and physiological arousal during fear
imagery is not always observed.McTeague, Bradley,
and Lang (2002) found no association between
imagery ability and physiological reactivity during
emotional imagery, whether such reactivity was
indexed by autonomic responses (heart rate, skin
conductance), facial EMG (corrugator and orbicu-
laris), or startle blink reflex.
Relatively few studies have examined individual
differences in mental imagery and its relationship to
imagery-based treatment outcomes in clinical pop-
ulations. McNeil et al. (1993) found that physio-
logical reactivity and subjective reports of distress
were greater in individuals with higher relative to
lower self-reported imagery generation ability.
However, this effectwas only observed in individuals
with specific phobias (e.g., dental), and not in those
with social anxiety. In chronic PTSD patients
undergoing prolonged imaginal exposure treatment,
Rauch, Foa, Furr, and Filip (2004) found that
participants’ self-reported anxiety and imagery
vividness were correlated, and both decreased
significantly during treatment. However, while
subjective anxiety change was related to treatment
outcome, imagery vividness change was not signif-
icantly related to treatment outcome (Rauch et al.,
2004).Given thesemixed results, it presently remains
uncertain how robust a difference there exists in the
intensity of emotional responding to imagery,
between people who exhibit good and poor imagery
ability, and how these differences relate to
imagery-based treatment outcomes. The resolution
of issue clearly requires further research.
In recent years, researchers have begun to investi-
gate whether bias in the relative ability to generate
mental imagery of emotionally negative compared to
emotionally positive scenarios may be associated
with emotional psychopathology. Several studies
have used the Prospective Imagery Task (PIT;
Holmes, Lang, Moulds, & Steele, 2008; Stöber,
2000) to assess imagery vividness. In this task,
participants are required to generate mental imagery
cued by negative and positive sentences depicting
self-referential future scenarios (e.g., negative
scenario: “You will be the victim of crime”; positive
scenario: “You will have lots of energy and
enthusiasm”). Results from such studies indicate
that, compared to healthy controls, individuals with
depressed mood (Holmes, Lang, Moulds, & Steele,
2008), and those with a diagnosis of clinical
depression or anxiety (Morina, Deeprose, Pusowski,
Schmid, & Holmes, 2011) report lower imagery
vividness (i.e., visual clarity) for positive scenarios.
Participants with depressed mood (Holmes, Lang,
Moulds, & Steele, 2008) and anxiety disorders
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imagery for negative scenarios compared to healthy
controls, though this latter effect is not observed in
clinically depressed participants (Morina et al., 2011).
In addition, researchers have begun to move
beyond cross-sectional data and to examine tem-
poral relationships between imagery vividness and
emotional psychopathology. Blackwell et al. (2015)
conducted a randomized controlled trial in which
150 depressed adults received either a positive
imagery intervention involving repeated generation
of mental imagery involving pleasant daily activities,
or a nonimagery “sham training” control condition,
both delivered via the Internet over 4 weeks. Results
indicate that the more vividly participants in the
positive imagery condition could imagine the positive
training scenarios at baseline, the greater their
reduction in depression symptoms over the course
of the intervention (Blackwell et al., 2015). Future
studies should more directly assess the relationship
between changes in imagery vividness and changes in
symptomology.
Researchers have also started to explore disorder-
linked individual differences in the tendency to
spontaneously experience emotional mental imagery
in daily life. Negative self-concept in unselected
undergraduate students has been found to be
positively associated with the frequency of retro-
spectively reported negative spontaneous cognitions,
consisting predominantly of imagery-based memo-
ries of past negative experiences (Krans, de Bree, &
Moulds, 2015). It has also been shown that,
compared to formerly-depressed and never-
depressed individuals, depressed individuals report
experiencing spontaneous imagery-based memories,
which were predominantly negative in content, as
more vivid, evoking greater subjective distress, and
causing greater disruption to daily life (Newby &
Moulds, 2011).
Future emotional psychopathology-linked individ-
ual differences research may benefit from obtaining
convergent measures of emotional response during
mental imagery, such as measures of physiology and
hemodynamic neural activity. In addition to indices of
emotional response during imagery, electroencepha-
lography (EEG) measures of cortical brain electrical
activity may provide indices of the level of cognitive
resources expended during imagery as an additional
measure of the impact of emotional imagery. One
recent study from Lang and colleagues examining
alpha-band activity during emotional mental imagery
suggests EEG may provide an objective measure of
neural activity involved in semantic, motor, and
perceptual representations of emotional stimuli.
Bartsch, Hamuni, Miskovic, Lang, and Keil (2015)
found that while mental imagery elicited by pleasantand unpleasant verbs prompted equivalent levels of
alpha amplitude, both were higher than that
observed during imagery of emotionally neutral
verbs. Alpha-band (8-12 Hz) activity is associated
with internally directed attention andmay be used to
index individual differences in emotional
imagery-related brain activity in translational and
clinical research.
Could it be that individual differences in imagery-
based processing of verbal information causally
underpins vulnerability to emotional psychopathol-
ogy, and/or functionally contributes to its mainte-
nance? So far, research linking individual
differences in emotional mental imagery generation
and emotional psychopathology has been correla-
tional in nature. More experimental research is
required to investigate if and how the ability and
tendency to experience emotional mental imagery is
causally related to emotional wellbeing and dys-
function. Several mechanisms have been proposed
and require further investigation. One hypothesis is
that mental imagery acts as an emotional amplifier
and exacerbates states of mood instability, such
as in bipolar disorder (Holmes, Geddes, Colom, &
Goodwin, 2008). From a treatment perspective,
enhancing the ability to mentally simulate positive
scenarios may causally relate to improved emotional
functioning via cognitive and behavioral mecha-
nisms such as enhanced negativemood repair, and/or
increased anticipatory pleasure and approach moti-
vation for daily activities. The outcomes of such
future research will inform how best to exploit our
increasing understanding of individual differences in
mental imagery inways that can enhance the efficacy
of our therapeutic interventions for clinical anxiety
and depression.
Section VI: Neglected Insights From Lang’s
Work on Mental Imagery Emotional
Response Training
A critical yet largely overlooked finding from
Lang’s (1977, 1979) experimental work is the
demonstration that the emotional impact of imag-
ery can be modulated via training. Lang’s psycho-
physiology studies provided reliable evidence that
physiological arousal during mental imagery of
fearful scenes can be increased in two ways. One is
via the inclusion of somatovisceral response infor-
mation in the verbal scripts used to cue imagery
(e.g., “your heart is pounding”). The other is via the
positive reinforcement of participants’ verbal re-
ports of mental imagery containing somatovisceral
response during an initial training phase (e.g., “I felt
myself running down the hill fast . . . my heart was
beating”). Several studies by Lang and colleagues
have demonstrated that such imagery training
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responses during imagery (Lang, Kozak, Miller,
Levin, & McLean, 1980; Lang et al., 1983; Miller
et al., 1987). As discussed earlier, the effectiveness
of imaginal exposure therapy rests partly on the
presence of initial emotional arousal to the imaginal
feared stimuli. Thus, training that enhances emotion-
al response during negative imagery may improve
fear-extinction treatment outcomes.
Furthermore, training that can increase the emo-
tional impact of mental imagery may serve to
enhance the effectiveness of positive imagery inter-
ventions for clinical patients who exhibit deficits in
positive imagery. As described earlier, the cognitive
bias modification approach has recently been com-
bined with mental imagery training to target
interpretation bias in both mood and anxiety
disorders. Imagery-based interpretation bias modifi-
cation (IBM) training involves repeatedly generating
imagery in response to verbal sentences and picture-
word pairs depicting hypothetical everyday scenarios
that resolve positively. Experimental studies have
shown that imagery-based IBM training of this
nature improves mood to a greater degree than
does verbal-based IBM training (Holmes, Lang,
et al., 2009; Holmes et al., 2006; T. Lang,
Blackwell, Harmer, Davison, & Holmes, 2012). To
date, several randomized-controlled clinical trials
have been conducted, with mixed preliminary
findings. While results from two such trials indicate
positive imagery IBM training to be a promising and
accessible Internet intervention for improving mood
and alleviating symptoms in depression (Williams,
Blackwell, Mackenzie, Holmes, & Andrews, 2013;
Williams et al., 2015), another trial found no support
for the positive IBM imagery condition being better
than a non-imagery-focused, noninterpretation
training, control condition (Blackwell et al., 2015).
It seems reasonable to suppose that the efficacy of
this imagery-based IBM training would be further
enhanced by increasing the positive emotional
impact of the trained pattern of positive imagery.
This objective may be served by integrating the
somatovisceral response amplification techniques,
developed by Lang and colleagues, into imagery-
based IBM programs designed to increase the
occurrence of positive imagery, which represents an
important avenue for future research in this area.
Section VII: Conclusion and Future Directions
Charting the progress of emotional mental imagery
research across the past five decades since Lang’s
(1977) seminal paper has clearly illustrated the
major impact of his bio-informational theory and
experimental research on this field. Following Lang’s
footsteps, both experimental and translational re-searchers have continued to be fascinated by the
special relationship that exists between mental
imagery and emotion.
In emphasizing mental imagery’s capacity to
activate perceptual stimulus representations as well
as physiological and behavioral responses, Lang’s
theory and experimental work provided crucial
insights into the field of behavior therapy. Specifi-
cally, physiological fear response during imagery of
feared stimuli has been identified as the marker of
successful learning during imaginal exposure and
habituation. In light of this finding, evidence
reviewed in Section I showing blunted physiological
fear response in patients suffering more chronic
anxiety and mood dysfunction represents a serious
concern in the clinical field. Specifically, it suggests
that such individuals may require additional support
to enhance physiological responding in order to
maximally benefit from the corrective effects of
imaginal (or in vivo) exposure therapy. Given that
the success of imaginal exposure therapy in facilitat-
ing fear-extinction hinges upon the patient exhibiting
initial physiological arousal to the imagined fear
stimuli, the efficacy of other CBT treatments using
mental imagery to facilitate emotional processing
may also be enhanced by taking steps to ensure that
emotional responses to mental imagery are maxi-
mized. Future clinical translational and treatment
efficacy researchmaywell benefit fromusing training
techniques pioneered by Lang to keep affect “hot”
during critical moments in therapy.
Recent individual differences research has begun
to illuminate how bias in the relative ability to
voluntarily generate emotional imagery, and bias in
the tendency to spontaneously experience emotion-
al imagery, differentiates those experiencing emo-
tional disturbance from healthy individuals. This
line of experimental research has important clinical
implications, as an excess of unwanted emotional
mental imagery requires therapeutic alteration.
Further, the inability to generate positive imagery,
or inability to respond to negative imagery, has
treatment implications for depression and exposure
therapy. Particularly promising is experimental
research that investigates how the relationship
between mental imagery and emotion can be
exploited for clinical benefit via cognitive bias
modification training. Future research on positive
mental imagery training could be enhanced by
incorporating Lang’s method of emotional imagery
response training, using imagery-eliciting scripts
that contain both stimulus and response information,
combined with training procedures that positively
reinforce emotional responding during mental imag-
ery. Furthermore, measuring both subjective and
neurophysiological indices of emotional response
715emot ional mental imagery as s imulat ion of real i tyduring positive mental imagery training may provide
additional information in identifying treatment
responders in future research.
Nearly 40 years ago, Lang’s seminal work on
emotional imagery laid the foundation for a new
era of experimental and clinical research on this
fascinating topic. While subsequent researchers
have been able to build upon this firm foundation
in ways that have greatly expanded knowledge and
understanding, it is remarkable that Lang’s original
questions, and the findings produced by Lang and
his collaborators, have remained of such central
importance within the burgeoning contemporary
literature. We are confident that this will continue
to be the case across the years that lie ahead, and we
are honored to have been given this opportunity to
celebrate, and pay tribute to, Lang’s extraordinary
scientific and clinical legacy.
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